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The use of computers in health organizations raises questions as to
the privacy and confidentiality of automated information. Results of
several site visits are forwarded as a means for establishing the state
of the art in medical information systems. The literature on the sub-
ject, sparse as it is, is reviewed. Afiframework for analyzing the matter
of data security is described. The major problem with medical data see-
curity is taken to be the uncertainty surrounding the decision as to the
required level and degree of security. In order to investigate the di-
mensions of the problem several hypotheses are tested with the aid of a
Security Attitude Survey which was administered to a sample of physicians
and managers.
The results of the questionnaire are analysed and lead to the fol-
lowing conclusions. First, physicians, much more so than managers,
perceive automated data as more susceptible than other data to either
accidental or intentional disclosure, modification or destruction.
Second, managers do not believe that confidentiality is threatendd
by computers, while physicians are more indifferent on this question.
Third, there will be a great demand for secure systems in the future.
This is so because (1) those most familiar with current systems view
them as less than totally secure, and (2) most users see the role of the
computer in health as expanding dramatically. Fourth, general agreement
exists as to the nature of automated data. The most sensitive data
should be the freest from interference and the least open to access.
Thesis Supervisor: John F. Rockart
Associate Professor of ManagementTitle:
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1.1 INTRCDUCTION
The use of computers in health systems is becoming more extensive.
Currently, computers are used in such varied application areas as payroll
and patient monitoring systems. Because health expenditures form such
a large part of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) and since medical
costs have recently risen so rapidly, it will be important for this sector
to develop even more effective means for applying computer technology
in the future.1 It seems increasingly important in these times of greth
and innovation to evaluate the scope and breadth of automation so that
fundamental institutions and relationships are maintained despite tech-
nical change. As applications of computers increase, one must recognize
that computers can be subverted for means which were never intended. The
aim of this thesis is to analyze and discuss some of the issues relating
to data and information security in the medical environment. This
analysis will include an assessment of the state of the art in computer
usage, a brief review of the literature, a framework for analysis, a
statement of the problem, hypotheses, a discussion of the questionnaire
that is used to test these hypotheses in a medical setting, andfinally,
the analysis of the data and presentation of conclusions.
1 U.S. health expenditures were 7.4 percent of the GNP in 1971. Further-
more, health-care costs have been rising at a rate that is twice the
average increase in costs in the economy. This is a more rapid rise than
any other component of the consumer price indes.
Before proceeding further it is best to define some of the terms
that will be used. Data security is a term that denotes safety or
freedom from any threat. Data, itself, can have several states or
qualities. Data can be private, confidential, operational, or public
knowledge. Common threats to data are disclosure, modification or
destruction whether they be accidental or malicious. Often, such
countermeasures as passwords, encryption, and physical security are
employed aghinst these threats. In Exhibits 1 and 2 these terms are
defined.
At this point it also is useful to provide the reader with some
examples of threats to medical information systems. The following three
scenarios are suggested as possibilities:
1. Many medical facilities have large automated files of patient
demographic information. Suppose a computer programmer who was
heavily in debt decided to sell all patient names and addresses
to a direct mail advertising firm.
2. The use of automated patient scheduling systems is expanding
especially in outpatient or ambulatory clinics. Doctor's
schedules are stored in the computer and can be accessed or
updated via a CRT or television like device. Consider the
impact of appointment information leaks. Suppose a business
firm sends their employees to a clinic and one of the patients
Exhibit 1
Key Definitions and Concepts
in Data Security
Private: Data are private if they relate to a specific individual and
should not be known by anyone but that individual. For example, one
could claim that the amount of one's contribution to a charitable fund
was a private matter of concern to no one else.
Confidential: Data are confidential if they can be shared openly within
the context of a professional relationship, i.e., doctor-patient,
manager-employee, etc. However, the data should not be available to
anyone outside this professional relationship.
Operational: Data are operational if they are needed for the normal
functioning of a business. The information should be available to all
personnel who require the information in order to perform adequately
their job(s).
Public Knowledge: Data are public knowledge if they can be openly
known by all persons either within or outside a business.
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Exhibit 2
Common Security Threats
and dounterneaSures
Common threats against data security are computer installation
sabotage, accidental system breakdown, fraud, embezzlement, interception
errors, disclosure of data, theft, sabotage or unauthorized copying of
data. Data security can be created and maintained by some or all of the
following elements:
Technical Protection (automated):
-computer system integrity (operating system, backup power,
fire protection)
-remote access control (terminal authorization, user
identification)
-data encoding (encryption).
Procedural Protection (manual):
-physical access control (guards, badges, locks, etc.)
-data handling rules (offsite storage, written requisition
of storage volumes)
-program modification rules
-input/output separation
-input/output controls
-audit.
Personnel Protection:
-preemployment screening
-supervision
-division of responsibility.
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notices on the CRT screen that his boss is scheduled to see
a psychiatrist.
3. Many medical facilities are automating patient medical records.
Assume a patient were allergic to penicillin but for some
reason (data input error, accidental modification, or deliberate
tampering) the patient's automated record reports no such
allergy. The patient goes into shock and dies after a penicillin
innoculation administered by a doctor who thought the medical
record was correct.
These scenarios are meant to offer a context in which to view the medical
data security problem. They represent threats to information which are
possible. It should be noted that many of these same threats would
pertain to non-computer systems as well. The difference is that with
computerized systems one may be ablecto bring data security under tighter
control and thus successfully deter these threats.
1.2 STATE OF THE ART IN
MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Before analyzing medical data security, it is necessary to assess
the extent to which computers are actually being used by those in the
medical community. (For a general overview of current computer
applications in medicine, see Ryan and Monroe (11).) In order to make
12.
a thorough assessment of the state of the art in computer usage a series
of field interviews were conducted. Sites were chosen so that a reason-
ably diverse set of organizational criteria could be observed. This
diversity will become apparent as one reads through the brief site
visit summaries that follow.
1.2.1 MEDICAL E12WER 1 (MCI)
MCl is a large, fee-for-service, specialty clinic that has used
computers for many years to improve the delivery of ambulatory medical
care. Numerous applications have been undertaken on both the medical
side and the management side of operations. Examples of each are:
Medical
- Medical History
- Diagnosis History
- Laboratory
- Research
- Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory
- Other Test Results
Management
- Appointment Making
- Billing
-Accounts Receivable
- Payroll and Personnel
- Patient Data Base
- Budget
One of the most important systems for any outpatient facility is its
appointment-making function. Because the amount of physician time
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available for scheduling with patients is a critical resource, the
organization must effectively manage this area or face a loss of revenue.
M has developed an online appointment system that permits coordinators
to query doctor availability files while talking on the phone with
patients. Key features of the system are the dynamic update capability
and the automatic generation of numerous hard copy reports such as the
dodtor's daily schedule. This system alone has allowed Ml to provide
service to many more patients without having to increase manpower
substantially.
1.2.2 MEDICAL CENTER 2 (M2)
E2 is a university health plan serving over 10,000 students, staff,
4ad faculty. Currently, MC2 is converting to a new information system
with the following planned features:
1. A patient master file for storing details on all patient
activities. Data included would be mdical history, diagnosis,
treatment, and,. follow-up.
2. A pseudo-diagnostic routine would match patient symptoms with
a medical reference file and would suggest to the physician
the possible diagnosis and tests.
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3. A general analysis system would scan subsets of the history
file for trends in the health of the patient population and
would evaluate the effectiveness of certain drug treatments.
4. Anonymous information would be made available to university
researchers who might want to use the clinical data base.
1.2.3 MEDICAL CENTER 3 (M3)
EC3 is a newly established, prepaid, group practice or more popularly
a health maintenance organization (HMO). HMOs are an emerging mode of
delivering health services that stresses the aspects of preventive
health maintenance and comprehensiveness. An important application at
NE3 is the online medical record system. This is an heroic undertaking
which has not been successfully implemented at more than a handful
of the nation's medical institutions, primarily because of the unwieldy
nature of most medical records. The M3 approach has been to segment
the-record into two parts -- encounter reports and status reports. The
former detail the results of any physician visit and the latter summarize
the up-to-date health of the patient.
1.2.4 MEDICAL CMITER 4 (MC4)
MC4 is a large, urban, voluntary hospital. Within MC4 are two
separate information processing centers. One unit focuses entirely on
medical applications, while another develops administrative systems.
For the past decade both groups have been working on innovative methods
of applying computer technology to delivering in-patient medical care.
An important product of this effort is a high-level, interpretative,
computer language with special hospital-related features. Some of the
representative systems tackled by the MCh medical unit are:
- Clinical Laboratory System
- Sequential Problem Solving
- Computer-Based Examinations for Medical Students
- Radiology Report Generation System
- Computer-Based Medical Record for Intensive Care Uhit
- Computer-Assisted Acute Respiratory Care
- Diabetic Ketoacidosis Program
Many of these systems although initially developed at 104 are now being
implemented at other medical centers throughout the country.
These, then, are the four organisations that were visited. The
sites were selected both for their diversity in objectives and for their
pursuit of effective computer applications to medicine. These visits
demonstrated that a dichotomy exists in most medical information systems
between applications primarily in support of management or administration
and applications primarily in support of delivery of medical care. The
knowledge gained from these visits facilitated the construction of a
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framework suitable for analyzing the security issue in medical organiza-
tions. Before we consider this framework, however, a brief review of
the literature of medical data security is needed.
1.3 PAST EFFORTS IN MEDICAL DATA SECURITI
Not a great deal of work has been done specifically in the realm
of data security in the medical community. The majority of the efforts
to date have a strong legalistic bent and expound upon the importance of
maintaining basic patient rights to privacy.
Curran et al. (2 ) advocate the adoption of a code of ethics and
clearly defined rules and regulations to govern the protection of in-
formation in all health data systems. A similar recommendation is made
by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in its
request for a Code of Fair Information Practice (8 ). The key safeguard
requirements of this proposed HEW code are:
- There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose wry
very existence is sec±et.
- There must be a way for an individual to find out what information
about him is in a record and how it is used.
- There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent.
- There must be a way for an individual to correct or ammend a
record of identifiable information about him.
- Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability
of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to
prevent misuse of the data. ( 8, p.18 )
Debate on the merits of these recommendations is under way in Congress,
and reliable opinion is that a law may be passed soon in this area.
Freed (h ) takes an in depth look at the legal aspects of using
computers in medicine. He expresses that because hospital record
systems offer less valuable returns than such computer crimes as check
or credit forgery, less rigorous security systems will probably be accept-
able in automated health systems.
Two instances of private institutions analysing the problem of
information security have been reported by Hulac (6 ) and Davis (3 ).
The former describes an urban, comprehensive, health system in Denver,
Colorado. A list of standards for ensuring the proper handling of
patient data is presented. The latter reports on the Kaiser-Permanente
Health System, a large, nationwide, prepaid, group practice, that has
been very active in the application of computer technology to medicine.
Except for the above, the area of medical information security
has received little further attention (1,7,10,12,13,16,17,18 ).
Our present intention is to provide a more systematic analysis of the
requirements for data security in the medical industry. To achieve this
end it is necessary to compile a framework suitable for analyzing
health information systems.
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2.1 ANALYTIC FRAMlORK
From a study of numerous user sites in various industries, an MIT
Sloan group (14) developed a framework consisting of these major com-
ponents:
1. Organizational Environment
2. Data Environment
3. Technological Environment
The major policy variable to be analyzed is the amount of requisite
security for any given information system. Security features have some
cost associated with them. The amount of time and money expended on
security by an organization is strictly a fthction of the three indepen-
dent variables: orgatization, data, and technology. By carefully
examining the dependent variable, security requirements, in this manner
one is then able to make comparisons across organizations and across
groups within the same organization.
At least four means are available for expressing the organizational
variable. These measures are orgAfizational activity, organizational
size, organiantional goals, and organizational structure. In the koalth
sector a great diversity exists across each of these measures. For
example, although all medical organizaticns are concerned with the im-
provement or maintenance of health, this goal can be met by any number
of activities. Some organizations serve only a small group of patients;
others try to meet the needs of entire communities. Mny organizations
are active in providing inpatient (hospital-based) care and others con-
centrate on outpatient or ambulatory care.
With respect to the second independent variable, data, there are
two dimensions which describe its nature. These are data types and data
attributes. Data types refer to data which are either personal (i.e.,
medical histories) or not personal (i.e., software). The distinction
here is sharp: either .data are personal or, they are not. Data attrib-
utes, on the other hand, are more relative as they refer to the private,
confidential, operational, or public nature of the data (see Exhibit 1).
In health systems there are generally large files of personal data relat*.
ing to all aspects of a patient's medical and financial history. With
the high demand for these data by different groups with varying needs-
to-know, it becomes an important matter if one can differentiate on a
confidentiality scale between personal data relating to diagnoses and
personal data relating to payments. In other words, to construct the
data access rijghts for any information system, one must, first, determine
who the individuals or groups are that require access, second, the attrib-
utes of the data must be rigorously specified, and third, the links
between data attributes and individuals can then be mapped out.
The third independent variable, technology, is included because it
is clear thitthecaedaddfor security can be to a large extent dictated
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by the type of installed configuration. For example, a time sharing sys-
tem using remote terminals connected to a computer via telephone lines
has a number of security threats to deal with that do not exist in a
batch system which is physically isolated from the outside world.
Similarly, the operating systems of the major computer manufacturers
generally are more or less vulnerable to different threats.
This then is a framework which facilitates data security analysis.
The three key independent variables of organization, data and technology
are the major determinants of a user's requirements for data security.
We now turn to an applicatton of this framework.
2.2 METHDOLOGI
Any scientific investigation moves from initial observations about
some condition to more refined, general statements that attempt to ex-
plain the nature of a system. This process of defining the problem,
testing the hypotheses, and stating the theory has been employed in this
anagysis as well. Before we could adequately define the problem, however,
it was necessary to talk at length with those in the field who were
working with medical information systems. Numerous interviews were
conducted with physicians and managers in health organizations actively
involved in automating the process of delivering medical care. From
these discussions emerged a good feeling for the problems concomitant
with using computers in medicine. The best way to state the problem
is that current users of computer technology are uncertain as to what
21.
level of security is needed for their system. This uncertainty exists
because computer growth in the industry has been rapid with an attendant
lack of planning for security. Uncertainty also exists due to the general
lack of experience with data security risks.
2.2.1 HYPOTHESES
In order to examine the dimensions of this problem a number of
hypotheses were developed. Some of the hypotheses are general in that
they apply to data security in any context whether it be the financial,
educational, or medical setting. Other hypotheses relate more specifically
to the problem of medical data security. The more general hypotheses
are:
G.H.1: Security demanded by a user is a function of the user's
awareness of security as a problem.
G.H.2: In an organization an individual's proximity (in terms
of job function) to the computer system will determine
his awareness of security as a problem.
G.H.3: Differences in levels of security awareness and in approach-
es to the security problem are a function of the nature of
processing in an industry and the perceived value of the
information being processed.
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These hypotheses have been discussed at length elsewhere (5, ),
and they will receive only light treatment here. Rather this thesis
investigates the special problems of security in the medical environment.
From our work in the field, it became clear that the following areas
warranted further study:
-The threat of computers to confidential relationships,
-The perceived adequacy of present medical data security systems,
-The sensitive nature of medical data, and
-The access rights of different individuals to medical data.
These four areas of concern capture the essence of the uncertainty
problem.
The above areas can be stated more formally as testable hypotheses.
These are the hypotheses specific to the medical industry:
M.H.1: Computers by their very nature are perceived as a threat
to confidential relationships, e.g., physician-patient,
manager-employee.
M.H.2: As medical computer usage expands, there will be an ever
increasing need for security.
M.H.3: In a Medical/Management Information System numerous types
of data are processed and stored from employee payroll to
patient diagnosis. These data items are fundamentally
different in nature and dntent, some being public knowledge
and others being highly confidential.
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It is hypothesized that:
1) these different data types can be identified
2) the different data types have varying needs for security
due to their various degrees of sensitivity, and
3) the access rights of an employee to different types of
data is a function of his need to know and the relative
sensitivity of the data.
In addition to the above, an analysis will be made of any underlying
differences in the responses of the sample population, i.e., do managers
and physicians have similar attitudes with respect to data sedurity?
2.2.2 PRINCIPLES OF MASUREMElT
In order to test these hypotheses, many of which deal with attitudes,
it was necessary to construct a measurement tool. This tool had to adhere
to a prescribed set of principles. Let us examine these principles
briefly before going on to consider the tool itself. (For a more detailed
discussion of this entire subject see Oppenheim( 9, p.1 2 0) which is
summarized below.)
1. Undimensionality or homogeneity -- One thing at a time must be
measured not three. If one is measuring length then you cannot
measure temperature or viscocity. A problem with attitudes is
that questions may stimulate numerous unmeasurable (or unan-
ticipated) responses.
2. Linearity and equal intervals or equal-appearing intervals--
A scale should follow the straight line model and a scoring
24.
system should be devised with interchangeable units. Attitude
scales assume linearity (although this may be inadequate), but
the creation of scoring units is difficult, and they are not
generally interchangeable.
3. Reliability -- Measurements taken today and next week should
be identical provided the object has not changed. Consistency
can be achieved by greater length and diversity in attitude
scales, but complete consistency is difficult to achieve since
people are bound to react differently to a scale when they are
confronted with it a second time.
h. Validity -- Are we measuring what we thought we were measuring?
One may obtain uni4toonsionality by keeping only those items
which intercorrelate highly, yet the scale may not measure what
we want it to measure. For example, instead of measuring
authoritarianism it may just be a measure of acquiescence.
5. Reproducibility -- This principle relates to a continuum of
attitudes and cumulative scaling. This may not be required
when dealing with constant and interchangeable units, such as
pounds or inches, but, say, if one is dealing with symptoms of
a;disease it is helpful if the symptoms could be scaled in
terms of seriousness. In that way the presence of symptom D
would dictate that a patient also must have symptoms A, B, and
C.
In attitude research with questionnaires these five principles must be
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observed. Now, we proceed to consider the actual measurement tool.
2.3 THE SECURITY ATTITUDE SURVEf
We have stated the problem with respect to data security in medical
information systems, and we have presented a list of hypotheses to be
tested. The actual test of these hypotheses is achieved by administering
a set of questions to those who work directly in the medical community.
We have put together a five-part Security Attitude Survey which assesses
the needs of a particular organization for data security (see Appendix
for the complete document). The questionnaire is divided into sections
as follows:
1. Computer utilization -- this section reveals the extent of the
subject's familiarity with computers and any biases pro or con
they may have toward computers in medicine.
2. Security and Privacy in the 1970's -- these questions deal with
general topics about perceived threats of computers to con-
fidential relationships and the security of computerized data
vis a vis other forms of data.
3. Computer Security at the Medical Center -- this section asks
the subject to specify the nature of a given number of data
items. The respondent must differentiate between data which
are private, confidential, operational, and public knowledge.
Next, the need for securing each data item is rated on a
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scale from extremely important to extremely unimportant.
Finally, an access control matrix is presented which requiree
that a type of access be specified for each person to each data
item. For example, all employees may be permitted to have
access only to summaries of patient diagnoses. This is the
most drucial section of the questionnaire.
4. Respondent Profile -- Job functions and years of employment
are queried.
5. Comments.
This tool was extensively pre-tested to eliminate ambiguity in wording
and to further refine the measures.
Results of several site visits have been forwarded as a means for
establishing the state of the art in medical information systems. The
literature on the subject, sparse as it is, has been reviewed. A frame-
work for analyzing the matter of data security has been described. It
was stated that the major problem with medical data security is the
uncertainty surrounding the decision as to the required level and degree
of security. A number of general and specific hypotheses have been
advanced which seek to explain the data security prcblem. These hypoth-
eses are tested by a Security Attitude Survey which was designed to
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conform to a set of measurement criteria. We now proceed to a consider-
ation of the results of this survey.
28.
3.1 The Site--Medical Center 1
The Security Attitude Survey was administered to a group of physicians
and managers at Medical Center 1 (MUl), a large specialty clinic that
was founded in the 1920's. Currently MGl employs about one hundred ,
physicians, twenty managers, and six hundred support personnel. Patient
volume is on the order of seven hundred per day. Computer systems have
been used by MGl for nearly a decade to assist in the process of delivering
quality medicine. At present there is an on-line appointment systemn that
consists of twenty-five computer terminals connected to the central pro-
cessing unit. In the future it is anticipated that several additional
systems will allow on-line enquiry of the MCl central data base. As
this development proceeds the issue of data security will become more
important because of the sharp increase in the number of users of the
various systems. This section presents an analysis of the responses
to the questionnaire shown in the Appendix. It should be noted that
aside from the theoretical issues raised here, the Security Attitude
Survey also provides the management of 10l with a means for:
(1) identifying the nature of the different types of auto-
mated data,
(2) determining the relative need for security among these
data types, and
(3) specifying who should have access to what types of inform-
ation.
29.
3 2 Sampling
There are approximately twenty managers and one hundred physicians
at MC1. Because the time involved in completing the questionnaire was
nontrivial, a limited sample was necessary. An important consideration
in this regard is the confidence that one can put in any results derived
from a small sample. A simple formula for deciding on an appropriate
sample size is
n = x 2 s2 /L 2
where
n = required sample size
x = number of standard deviations within which estimate will
lie
s = population standard deviations
L = limit of error that can be tolerated.
In order to determine n, the other parameters must be guessed at or
supplied. For the purposes of this study there should be a probability
of .8 that an estimate lie within L. If one assumes further that the
population standard deviation is equal to 1.0 and that L should be small,
say 6.3 or less, thenenvwould be equal to 25.
n = (1.5)2 (1.0)2/ (.3)2
= 2.25/.09
=25
A sample of 26 was drawn, composed of 14 managers and 12 staff
physicians. Since the total management complement is about 20, this
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group represented approximately a 70% sample. Within the staff group
a balance was struck between medical and surgical specialists. In short,
it is assumed that the sample size is large enough to permit a thorough
analysis and that sampling,although not total, has been sufficiently
random.
3.3 Results and Analysis
A key part of the analysis of questionnaire data is the researcher's
assumption with respect to the distribution df responses. Continuous
distributions permit an analysis of the means and variances of responses.
Discrete distributions are not suitable for mean-variance analysis and,
thus, must be analyzed in terms of classes of data. In the case of this
study one can assume that Likert scales (e.g. agree-disagree, as shown
in Q#l-9) approximate a continuous distribution. However, the remaining
two hundred and twenty-six questions (Q#10-235) are distributed discretely
in that the responses are more of a qualitative than a quantitative
nature. With this in mind we now proceed to consider the results of the
survey and to determine the admissability of the hypotheses that were
proposed in section 2.2.1.
The means and standard deviations of all the questions are shown
in Table 1. Recall that for Q#10-235 the mean is not a "true mean"
since this is not measurement data. This qualitative mean does convey,
however, a sense of which discrete response dominates. These results
underly the following summary statements about the overall sample:
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Question
Number (Q#)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Table 1
Responses to Security Attitude Survey
Question
Mean(S.D.) Number (Q#)
1. 69 (1.09) 24'.
6.31 (1.12) 25
2.44 (1.47) 26
3.08 (2.10) 27
3.19 (1.77) 28
4.62 (1.88) 29
4.65 (1.85) 30
4.88 (2.23) 31
3.68 (2.08) 32
2.23 (0.51) 33
2.46 (0.76) 34
2.35 (o.49) 35
2.04 (0.45) 36
2.73 (0.45) 37
2.92 (0.48) 38-51
2.58 (0.50) 52-65
1.96 (0.72) 66-79
2.89 (0.43) 80-93
3.04 (0.34) 94-107
2.77 (0.51) 108-121
3.15 (0.54) 122-135
3.46 (0.76) 136-149
2.35 (0.49) 150-163
Mean(S.D.)
4.54 (0.65)
4.42 (0.86)
4.50 (0.76)
3.89 (1.07)
2.92 (1.20)
4.04 (0.96)
4.58 (0.90)
3.73 (1.22)
3.23 (1.28)
4.04 (0.87)
3.08 (1.35)
3.00 (1.52)
4.31 (0.84)
2.63
2.20
2.30
2.62
2.14
2.04
2.13
3.25
1.90
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Table 1 (continued)
Question
Number (Q#)
164-177
178-191
192-205
206-219
220-233
234
235
Mean (S.D.)
1.99
2.72
1.79
1.43
3.23
1.54
3.52
1. Computer Utilization--Most of the respondents felt that they
worked in close contact with computerized information. It was
believed that computers offered a significant benefit to the
medical community in general, and that their role would be
expanding at M01 in the near future.
2. Security and Privacy in the 1970's--There seemed to be a wide
range of opinion on the concern for threats to security, and,
in general, the response appears to be indifferent. There
appeared to be only a moderate indication that computerized
information was more vulnerable to security threats than other
forms of data. Most seemed to feel that computers did not pose
a threat to confidential relationships.
3. Computer Security at 1901--Once again the'e was a iide raoge
of responses as to the adequacy of present safoguards for the
MC1 computer system. Respondents indicated that medical data
was somewhat more confidential in nature than administrative
data, but the most private item of data was payroll information.
Answers to questions on the importance of securing one type of
data over another also demonstrated that, in general, it is more
important that medical data be secure from interference. The
trend emerging from the access control matrix is that only
certain physicians should have the most unrestricted access to
data,whereas, the general public should have little, if any,
33.
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access to automated data. In between these two extremes lies
a continuum which specifies which individuals or groups should
have what type of access to specific types of data.
Before we can draw any final conclusions from these data, however,
a more detailed analysis of the physicians' and managers' responses is
required. To determine this for Q#1-9 a test of the null hypothesis
that the mean response of managers was equal to the mean for physicians
was made. The results of this analysis are shoWn in Table 2. These
results clearly show for four of the first nine questions that there is
a statistically significant difference ( at the .10 level or better)
between the mean response for a manager as opposed to that of a physician.
Doctors appear to be more skeptical of the use of computers in health
organizations. Physicians were more strongly in agreement with the state-
ment that computerized information was more vulnerable to threats.
Managers were more strongly in disagreement with the two statements
(Q#6-7) on the effect of computers on confidential relationships.
The answers for Q#9 tend to support the second general hypothesis
that was asserted in section 2.2.1. It was stated that an individual's
proximity in terms of job function to the computer system will influence
his awareness of security as a problem. The fact that managers see them-
selves as working 'somewhat more closely in contact with computerized
information would seem to explain why they are more familiar with the
shortcomings of present security mechanisms. However, these responses
also point to a central paradox in these results. Physicians are more
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Table 2
Test of H6: Mean Response for Staff Equal to
Mean Response for Management.
Staff Mean
(S.D.)
1.75(.96)
6.08
(1.50)
3.00
(1.79)
3.08(1.98)
2.42
(1.56)
3.92
(2.19)
3.75
(1.91)
4.33
(2.46)
2.92
(1.68)
Management Mean
(S.D.)
1.64
(1.22)
6.5 o
(0.65)
2.08
(1.04)
3.07
(2.27)
3.86
(1.70)
5.21
(1.37)
5.43
(1.45)
5.36
(1.98)
4.38
(2.22)
P *
ui= u2
.80
.39
.12
.99
.03
.09
.02
.26
.07
* Two-tail probability from t-test with separate variance estimate.
Q#1
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concerned about the vulnerability of computer systems and the possible
threats posed to confidentiality, but they are also more satisfied with
prelent security safeguardd. From the viewpoint of the other group,
managers are not very concerned about these threats, but they do feel
that present security is less than totally adequate.
As for the questions on the nature of data and the access rights
of users to it, several important results emerge. First, in most cases
medical data appear to rank ahead of administrative data in terms of
sensitivity. Second, the more sensitive the data type is, the more
important it is that this data type be secure from interference. Third,
the more sensitive the data type, the more restricted the access is to
this pkid of information. These conclusions can be drawn from Table 3
which shows a rank ordering of the overall mean responses for answers to
this set of questions. As you may note, payroll data ranks first in
terms of all indicators of security. In other words, it is the most
private informaticm, it is the most important to protect from any threat,
and it is the type bf data that should have the most restricted access.
After payroll data, however, the trend is that the majority of medically
related items appear to be more confidential in nature than administrative
data. On the other end of the spectrum, it is not surprising to note
that prices of services are seen as the most public of all the data.
There does not appear to be a great deal of disagreement between
managers and physicians as to the nature of these data types. A series
of cross tabulations of job function against all other discrete responses
revealed few statistically significant differences of opinion. These
Table 3
Rank Order of Data Types for Sets of
Questions on Sensitivity, Importance, and Access
Sensitivity Importance Access
Data Type (Q#10-23) (Q#24-37) (Q#38-233)
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank
Responses to Automated
Medical History 2.23 3 4.42 4 2.63 4
Patient Diagnoses 2.46 6 4.54 2 2.20 7
Lab test results 2.35 4 4.42 5 2.30 6
Personality inventory
results(MMPI) 2.04 2 4.50 3 2.62 5
Services rendered to
a patient 2.73 8 3.89 9 2.14 8
Name and address of
patient's local ND 2.92 11 2.92 14 2.04 10
Patient surgical
procedures 2.58 7 4.04 7 2.13 9
Payroll data -- name,
check amount, etc. 1.96 1 4.58 1 3.25 1
Patient names, addresses,
phone numbers, etc. 2.89 10 3.73 10 1.90 12
Appointment data--10 ND,
availability, bookings 3.04 12 3.23 11 1.99 11
Patient billing and
payment history 2.77 9 4.04 8 2.72 3
Blue Shield codes for
Medical Center services 3.15 13 3.08 12 1.79 13
Prices of all Medical
Center services 3.46 14 3.00 13 1.43 14
Total revenue generated
by each staff member 2.35 5 4.31 6 3.23 2
37.0
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Table 4
Results of Cross-Tabulation of Job Function (Q#234)
vs. All Other Discrete Responses (Q#10-233).
Significance Level
Q# From Chi-square test
10 .07
36 .09
52 .05
101 .09
108 .10
114 .04
116 .09
128 .09
138 .05
139 .06
150 .01
156 .04
211 .10
228
39.
Table 5
Rank Order of
Access Rights of Different Groups to
Medical and Administrative Data Types.
Access Table Group Medical Data Administrative Data
Mean Rank Mean Rank
A. Director of Clinical
Research 1.52 4 2.32 7
B. MC1 Staff Department
Chairman 1.29 2 1.58 1
C. All MC1 Physicians 1.42 3 2.02 5
D. Only Certain Ml
Physicians 1.14 1 1.69 2
E. All M1l Nurses 2.28 9 2.62 11
F. Only Certain Ml
Nurses 1.60 5 2.38 8
G. Director of Data Pro-
cessing and Appointment
Office 2.01 6 1.80 4
H. Director of Clinical
Laboratory 2.15 7 2.48 9
I. All MUl Managers 3.10 12 2.52 10
J. Only Certain MC1
Managers 2.15 8 1.74 3
K. All M01 Employees 3.67 13 3.23 13
L. Only Certain MC1
Employees 2.55 10 2.12 6
M. General Public 3.92 14 3.43 14
N. Only Certain Outside
Parties 2.76 11 2.69 12
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results are shown in Table 4.
One final generalization can be made from these results. In terms
of access rights of different groups to different data types, it appears
that certain managers and certain employees have higher access rights to
administrative data than they do to medical data. Table 5 shows the
mean and rank order of access rights for each group or individual to the
two different groups of data types, medical and administrative. As
one may note the access rights of the managerial and employee groups
is less restrictive for administrative data. Conversely, medical groups,
doctors and nurses, tend to have more of a routine access to medical data
than to administrative data. These results seem to indicate that a
perception of one's need to know determines his access rights.
3.4 SUMARY
This thesis has dealt with data security in the medical environment.
It has been proposed that the primary problem with medical data security
is the uncertaint? surrounding the decision as to the required level and
degree of computer security. In order to explore the dimensions of this
problem, several hypotheses were advanced. The results support the
following contentions:
- physicians, much more so than managers, perceive automated
data as more susceptible than other data to either accidental
or intentional disclosure, modification or destruction.
- managers do not believe that confidentiality is threatened
4l.
by computers, while physicians are more indifferent on this
question
- there will be a great demand for secure systems in the future.
This is so because (1) those most familiar with current
systems view them as less than totally secure, and (2) most
users see the role of the computer in health as expanding
dramatically.
- general agreement exists as to the nature of automated data.
The most sensitive data should be the freest from inter-
ference and the least open to access.
These conclusions lend support to two(M.H2 and M.H3) of the three hypo-
theses that were made for the medical community. 'Given these results,
much research remains to be done on the actual construction and imple-
mentation of a secure medical information system.
42.
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APPENDIX
Security Attitude Survey
The Medical Center (MC)
As you know the Medical Center has been doing things with computers for
a number of years. Currently the computer is used to help in such
different areas as printing the payroll, assisting in the appoint-
ment scheduling processing, and recording answers to patient medical
histories. It is probably quite likely that you have had several ex-
periences in the past with the Medical Center computer system.
This questionnaire is designed to survey your attitude on some of the
important issues raised by the use of computers in medical organizations.
Please complete the questions as carefully as possible. Less than
thirty minutes of your time will be required to finish the survey.
Part 1--Computer Utilization.
1. Miy work is such that I often come in contact with computerized
information. (Circle one.)
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#1
2. The use of computers in medicine offers little promise for providing
a higher level of care to patients and for achieving greater
efficiency in managing health institutions.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#2
3. In the next few years at the Medical Center, the computer will
play a larger and larger role in assisting in the delivery and
management of health care.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#3
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Part 2--Security and Privacy in the 1970's.
1. In general, I am quite concerned about such things as security leaks,
bugging, and the invasion of privacy.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7: Disagree Q#h
2. The computerization of information increases the liklihood that
such data will be used for unintended purposes. In other woris,
automated data is more susceptible than other data to either ac-
cidental or intentional disclosure, modification or destruction.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree #5
3. The use of computers in health organizations poe6f a threat to
the confidential relationship between a doctft-ad-pattent.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#6
4. The use of computers in health organizations poses a threat to
the confidential relationship between a manager and employee.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#7
5. If you want to make sure that information is kept from the know-
ledge of others then it is better to keep information in written
form and lock it in your desk rather than storing the information
in a computer.
Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#8
Part 3--Computer Security at the Lahey Clinic.
1. As far as my experience with the present Medical Center computer
*stem goes, the security of automated information appears to be
totally adequate.
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Strongly Strongly
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree Q#9
2. In the Medical Center computer system there are basically two types
of information, medical and administirative. The two columns at the
bottom of this page present e28mples of these data types. One
method of ranking the sensitivity of a particular item of data is
shown in lettered code below. How would you scale the sensitivity
of each type of data? In answering this question use the following
code by putting the correct letter next to each data type.
Code
Letter Code Description
A (1) These data are private in thlt they relate to a specific in-
dividual and shtuld not be known by anyone but that individual.
For example, one could claim that the amount of one's contri-
bution to a charitable fund was a private matter of concern
to no one else.
B (2) These data are confidential in that they should be shared openly
within the context of a professional relationship, i.e. doctor-
patient, employee-manager, etc. However, the data should not
be available to anyone outside of this confidential relation-
ship.
C (3) These data are oratioual and are necessary for the normal
functioning of the W5cal Center. The information should be
available to all personnel who require the information:in
order to perform adequately their job(s).
D (4) These data are public knowledge for all persons either within
orl'outside the Medical Ceiter.
E None of the above.
Medical Data Administrative Data
Code Code
Letter Data Type Letter Data Type
Q#10 Responses to Auto- Q#17 Payroll data--name, check
mated Medical History amount., deductions, etc.
Q#11 Diagnoses Q#18 Patient names, addresses,
phone numbers, etc.
Q#12 Lab test results Q#19 Appointment data--MC MD,
availability, bookings
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Medical Data
Code
Letter Data Type
Code
Letter
Q#13 Personality inventory Q#20_
results (MMPI)
Q#ih Services rendered to Q#21_
a patient
Q#15 Name and address ofpatientle local MD
Q#16
Q#22__
Patient surgical pro- Q#23
cedures
Administrative Data
Data Type
Patient billin
history
Blue Shield co
MC Services
Prices of all
and procedures
Total revenue
a staff member
Computers like people, are both fallible and vulnerab
stance, it is possible to intercept or disrupt the tr
computerized data. As proteteon certain security no
been developed which can daftl tm4 threat of accident
disclosure, modification, or 4ittction of informati
You have just scaled the relative sensitivity of seve
The next questift"i4y how i**rtant is it that these
be secure from inteiferene Vfthe above mentioned th
answer this, enter a number from 1 to 5 which signifi
importance of security for the particular data type.
Extremely
Important
Medical Data
Code
Number Data Type
Q#24 Responses to Auto-
mated Medical History
Diagnoses
Q#26 Lab test results
g and payment
les for
40 services
generated by
Le. For in-
ansmission of
:hanismu have
il or intentional
:>n.
ral data items.
same data items
reats? To
?s the relative
Unimpo ant
Administrative Data
Code
Number
Q#31
Q#32
Q#33_
Q#2 7  Personality inventory Q#34_
results (MPI)
Data Type
Payroll data--
amount, deduct
name, check
ions, etc.
Patient names, addresses,
Phone numbers, etc.
Appointment da
availability,
Patient billin
history
ta--E ND,
bookings
g and payment
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Medical Data Administrative Data
Code Code
Number Data Type Number Data Type
Q#28 Services rendered to Q#35 Blue Shield codes for
a patient Medical Center Services
Q#29 Name and address of Q#36 Prices of all Medical Center
patient's local MD services and procedures
Q#30 Patient surgical Q#37 Total revenue generated by
procedures a staff member
4. In many computer systems security mechanisms exist whereby certain
types of data can be assigned different kinds of access according
to various functions, *needs to know", or levels of authority.
For example, technological capabilities are such that an automated
record can be fully disclosed to one individual, while only a portion
of the same record is displayed to another person. One can easily
conceive of a situation in which this capability would be useful;
on a newspaper it is likely that a sports editor would need to have
access to different information than a fashion editor. Keeping
in mind the needs and constraints of the Medical Center, what types
of information would you allow each type of person named in the matrix
on page (50 ) to access?
In order to complete this final (but most critical) question,
please fill in the matrix on the next page. The rows in the matrix
correspond to the data types of the previous two questions, and the
coluxas refer to those who either should or should not have access
to each particular type of data. Enter the appropriate number in
the box under each "type of person" according to the type of access
which you believe should apply to that type of data.
To indicate your opinion as to the access rights of each type of
person please use the following codes.
Code
Number Code Description
1 This type of person should have routine access to any of
this data.
2 This type of person should have routine access only to
summarised data of this class, e.g. data which could not be
connected to a particular person.
Code
Number Code Description
This type of person should have special access to some of
this class of data provided appropriate authorization has
been granted for a particular case only.
This type of person should have absolutely no access to
this type of data at a4y time.
If the list of codes seems inadequate for a certain situation,
then simply leave that box blank or make any comments you wish.
To illustrate how this coding might work a portion of a completed
-wAtrix is shown below. In this particular ease it was felt that
all Ekemplyees (as a class) should not have access to patient
d noses or Iab test results. Thus setre are "1' (no access)
codes next to these dpta types. Also it was felt that IE prices
could be widely known by all emplyees, so there is a "1"
(routine access) code for that itea..
Now go on to the next page to complete the matrix.
K.
Patient diagnoses 4
Lab test results 4
Price of MC services 1
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ACCESS TABLE*
DA TA TYPE A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N.
Responses to Automated
Medical History Q#03. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Q#51
Patient Diagnoses Q#52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Q#65
Lab test results Q#66 . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#79
Personality inventory
results (MMPI) Q#80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#93
Services rendered to
a patient Q#9h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#107
Name and address of
patient's local MD Q#108 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#121
Patient surgical
procedures - _Q#122 . . . . . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#135
Payroll data--name,
check amount, etc. Q#136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#149
Patietet names, addresses,
phone numbers,, etc. Q#150 . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . Q#163
Appointment data-l-ME li,
availability, bookings Q#164 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#177
Patient billing and
payment history Q#178 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#191
Blue Shield codes for
metservices Q#192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Q#205
Prices of all U1
services Q#206 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Q#219
TotaI revenue generated
by-each staff member Q#220 .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Q#233
* See following page for explanation of access table codes.
ACCESS TABLE CMES
A. Director of Clinical Research
B. MCl Staff Department Chairmen-
C. All Ml physicians
D. Only certain M0l physicians*
E. All MEl nurses
F. Only certain MCl nurses*
G. Director of Data Processing and Appointment Office
H. Director of Clinical Laboratory
I. All MCl managers
J. Only certain Ml managers*
K. All MCl employees
L. Only certain MCl employees*
M. General public
N. Only certain outside parties*
*Pnly certain .... refers to those who in the course
of their job would be intimately concerned with a par-
ticular situation whether it be treating a particular
patient, managing a particular employee, etc.
Part h--Respondent Profile.
1. Position with Medical Center (check one).
Staff Management
2. Years of employment with Medical Center.
less than 1 year 1-2 years
5-10 years over 10 years
2-5 years
Part 5--Comments.
Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. If you are in-
terested in the results, I would be glad to supply you with a copy.
Any additional comments you might have on this survey will be appreciated
and can be made below.
